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ABSTRACT
Objectives To safely expand and adapt the normal 
workings of a large critical care unit in response to the 
COVID-19 pandemic.
Methods In April 2020, UK health systems were 
challenged to expand critical care capacity rapidly 
during the first wave of the COVID-19 pandemic so that 
they could accommodate patients with respiratory and 
multiple organ failure. Here, we describe the preparation 
and adaptive responses of a large critical care unit to the 
oncoming burden of disease. Our changes were similar 
to the revolution in manufacturing brought about by 
‘Long Shops’ of 1853 when Richard Garrett and Sons of 
Leiston started mass manufacture of traction engines. 
This innovation broke the whole process into smaller parts 
and increased productivity. When applied to COVID-19 
preparations, an assembly line approach had the 
advantage that our ICU became easily scalable to manage 
an influx of additional staff as well as the increase in 
admissions. Healthcare professionals could be replaced in 
case of absence and training focused on a smaller number 
of tasks.
Results Compared with the equivalent period in 2019, 
the ICU provided 30.9% more patient days (2599 to 3402), 
1845 of which were ventilated days (compared with 694 
in 2019, 165.8% increase) while time from first referral 
to ICU admission reduced from 193.8±123.8 min (±SD) 
to 110.7±76.75 min (±SD). Throughout, ICU maintained 
adequate capacity and also accepted patients from 
neighbouring hospitals. This was done by managing an 
additional 205 doctors (70% increase), 168 nurses who 
had previously worked in ICU and another 261 nurses 
deployed from other parts of the hospital (82% increase).
Our large tertiary hospital ensured a dedicated non- COVID 
ICU was staffed and equipped to take regional emergency 
referrals so that those patients requiring specialist surgery 
and treatment were treated throughout the COVID-19 
pandemic.
Conclusions We report how the challenge of managing 
a huge influx of patients and redeployed staff was met 
by deconstructing ICU care into its constituent parts. 
Although reported from the largest colocated ICU in the 
UK, we believe that this offers solutions to ICUs of all sizes 
and may provide a generalisable model for critical care 
pandemic surge planning.
INTRODUCTION
The UK confirmed its first cases of 
COVID-19 on the 31 January 2020. Experi-
ence from Italy provided an early warning 
for the UK to prepare for a substantial surge 
in critically ill patients if the health service 
were not to be overwhelmed. Reports from 
China and Italy suggested that 9%–26% of 
COVID-19 patients admitted to hospital 
required treatment in the intensive care 
units (ICU)1–3 with a median length of stay 
of 9 days.3 4 Modelling these data indicated 
that we would need to expand our capacity 
from 67 to more than 450 beds. Action was 
taken in accordance with national guid-
ance5 to reduce and then discontinue all 
elective surgery from 17 March. The subse-
quent exponential increase in the number 
of patients requiring organ support in the 
UK has been well reported.6
We were aware of a number of recom-
mendations for management of a surge in 
critical care demand7–9 but could find no 
information on how to operationalise the 
plan within such a large ICU. We therefore 
established a multidisciplinary working 
group and adopted an ‘Assembly Line’ 
approach focused on standardisation, 
simplification, upskilling and teamworking.
Organisation of critical care services before the 
pandemic
The Queen Elizabeth Hospital Birmingham 
(QEHB) was one of the largest single site 
hospitals in the NHS with 1200 beds and 
one of four acute hospitals in the University 
Hospitals Birmingham NHS Trust (UHB). 
In normal times, it was a major trauma and 
emergency centre serving the Midlands, as 
well as providing a national referral service 
for liver, renal, lung and cardiac trans-
plants, a regional service for neurosciences 
2 Oakley C, et al. BMJ Open Quality 2020;9:e001117. doi:10.1136/bmjoq-2020-001117
Open access 
and burns, and accommodating the Royal Centre for 
Defence Medicine. The ICU supporting these services 
had 100 bed spaces (24 as single isolation rooms) in 
four contiguous zones on one floor, normally funded 
to provide 67 level three equivalent beds. These were 
managed flexibly between level 1+, 2, 3 and 4 so that 
on average, 80 beds were used to treat patients at any 
one time. There were 43 specialist intensivists and 520 
whole time equivalent nursing staff (of which 376 were 
permanent staff) providing care according to national 
standards (Guidelines for the Provision of Intensive 
Care Services, V.2).10 Each day, the ICU was staffed 
by 8 consultants (specialists), 7 registrars (senior resi-
dents) and 12 trainees (interns) who worked a mixture 
of 12 hours (long days) and 9 hours (short days) shifts. 
Consultants covering the ICU at night normally oper-
ated an on- call system from home. Nurse:patient 
ratios were 2:1 for level 4, 1:1 for level 3 care, 1:2 for 
level 2. Nurses worked 12.5 hour shifts. Physiotherapy 
provided care at a ratio of 1:7 Monday to Friday with a 
prioritised service at weekends.
In 2019, the ICU cared for 4217 patients and provided 
over 29 153 patient days of intensive care of which 67% 
was for elective and 33% for emergency admissions.
METHODS
Our challenge was to expand critical care beds by up to 
500% while maintaining patient and staff safety, deliv-
ering quality care and contending with a potential reduc-
tion in the core workforce from sickness/shielding, carer 
responsibilities and isolation following COVID-19 expo-
sure. By breaking down each element of an ICU admis-
sion into its component parts, we planned to be resilient 
to these challenges. Staffing resources were increased in 
the ICU by releasing personnel from their duties else-
where in the hospital and from regional non- emergency 
hospitals. Although many of the seconded staff were allo-
cated from theatres that had been mothballed during the 
first wave surge, staff volunteered from all parts of the 
hospital (e.g. consultant hepatologists, audiology techni-
cians, out- patient nurses). The ‘Assembly Line’ approach 
allowed us to allocate a sudden surge of staff to teams that 
best used their skills and allowed packaged training to be 
targeted.
Planned pathway for ICU admission and management
The patient journey through ICU was streamlined as 
follows (figure 1):
 ► Critically ill patients were identified by ward staff.
 – During the surge preparations, the wards were sup-
plied with advice that defined patients unlikely to 
benefit from ICU according to national (National 
Institute for Health and Care Excellence guideline 
(NG159))11 and International guidance.12
 ► The COVID-19 Assessment Consultant attended the 
patient on the ward or in the emergency department 
(ED) and decided on the need and appropriateness 
for ICU admission.
 – In cases where the advantage of ICU admission was 
deemed marginal, the patient was discussed with 
another ICU consultant or our Institution’s Ethics 
Board.
 ► The patients were supported by Bag/Valve/Mask for 
the short transfer to a nearby intubation room.
 – As intubation is a high risk, aerosol generating pro-
cedure (AGP), we preidentified a number of areas 
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Figure 1 Overview of patient admission and ICU management. CIT, COVID-19 Intubation Team; ICU, intensive care unit.
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that were used for intubation with suitable airflow, 
space around the bed and privacy from general 
view. Rooms were identified on each ward and ED.
 – In the absence of evidence to the contrary at 
the time, the senior ICU staff agreed to suspend 
normal management of patients and did not use 
non- invasive ventilatory support during the first 
COVID-19 wave. This was for three reasons: (1) 
non- invasive ventilatory support is an AGP and 
transporting patients to the ICU would risk con-
tamination of the corridors (2) Non- Invasive 
Ventilation (NIV) uses higher oxygen flows and 
were concerned about the additional stress to our 
infrastructure and oxygen supply (3) the nursing 
intensity of an NIV patient is paradoxically higher 
and would have additionally stressed the inexperi-
enced staff.
 ► Redeployed consultant (attending) anaesthetists 
along with Operating Department Assistants formed 
the COVID-19 Intubation Team (CIT) who were 
mobilised in full personal protective equipment 
(PPE) from their base in theatres, to intubate and 
ventilate the patient.
Protocolised management in ICU
 ► Safe delivery to the ICU was achieved and met by a 
senior member of the ICU medical team who took 
handover from the CIT leader
 – The Lines Team had already been alerted and was 
waiting for the admission in ICU before the patient 
arrived. On arrival of the patient, vascular access 
as decided by the admitting doctor (arterial cannu-
lae, central venous pressure and renal replacement 
cannulae if required) was placed.
 – If proning or deproning were required, the pron-
ing team was contacted.
 – A team of fourth year medical students were re-
cruited to act as the Family Liaison Service to con-
tact relatives daily and impart the information. 
Additional information was provided by the clinical 
staff when required or when withdrawal of support-
ive care was being considered.
 – The clinical staff completed an update on the 
patient’s condition twice daily from a standard 
operating procedure template designed by the 
COVID-19 task force.
 – If the patient needed a tracheostomy, the Trachy 
Team were contacted and a time arranged for the 
procedure to be performed. Percutaneous trache-
ostomy was preferred as it reduced aerosol pro-
duction. If the Trachy Team were to consider that 
a surgical tracheostomy was needed then theatre 
time was booked in a dedicated COVID-19 theatre.
 – Prior to the procedure the ICU medical team 
contacted the family to discuss the decision and 
answered any questions.
 – Patients received daily respiratory physiotherapy 
which commenced within 24 hours of admission. 
Rehabilitation was started as early as possible in 
the patient’s recovery in ICU and continued on the 
wards.
 ► On discharge from the ICU, the patient was moved to 
COVID-19 wards where they were cared for by a team 
familiar with their needs. COVID-19 patients are a 
complex group with delirium, severe deconditioning, 
poor mobility and breathlessness,13 therefore, in order 
to keep the Assembly Line moving safely and to try 
to prevent readmission, an ICU consultant followed 
the discharged patients and a formal consultant to 
consultant handover was undertaken.
Implemented changes
ICU consultants proposed themselves for roles in the 
reorganisation according to their training, experience 
and strengths. The structure revolved around teamwork 
so that responsibility for an area did not fall on an indi-
vidual, cover could be maintained in the event of absence 
and consensus could be made. Important decisions (such 
as the decision not to use non- invasive ventilatory support 
and to intubate patients directly) were discussed and 
consensus obtained throughout the whole consultant 
body with face- to- face meetings, WhatsApp and email 
discussions.
Infrastructure
Within each ICU, normal bed- spaces contained two 
pendants that each carried oxygen (4 kPa Pressure; 2 
outlets) air (400 kPa supply; 2 outlets), suction (up to 
−80 kPa; 2 outlets), Anaesthetic Gas Scavenging System 
and 8 electrical sockets (240 V). The decision was made 
to place two beds in each bed- space so that staff were 
concentrated in one area. One trained ICU nurse super-
vised up to six non- ICU nursing staff. Concentrating 
patients in the same ICU footprint avoided diluting skills 
and knowledge rather than moving into theatres and 
other non- ICU venues.
Command
A dedicated task force of four ICU consultants trained 
in major incidents and mass causalities formed a line of 
command modelled on the gold/silver/bronze struc-
ture for coping with major incidents and mass casual-
ties for all acute sites of our institution. Gold managed 
the interactions between all service operators nationally 
and regionally; silver managed the status of ICU within 
the whole of UHB; bronze managed local site- based 
resources at QEHB. Operational updates and risks were 
escalated from bronze to silver daily. Meetings were 
held at the start and end of each shift to communicate 
changes in standard operating procedures, distribution 
of staff across the clinical areas and manage any points 
of pressure within the service. Daily shift safety huddles 
were undertaken with other ICU staff to update them on 
policy changes, stages of preparation, hospital status and 
future planning.
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Workforce
A total of 205 additional medical staff were sourced, 
primarily from the anaesthesia (47 of all grades) and also 
158 from medical and surgical specialities whose elective 
work had been curtailed, to work directly in the ICU. 
Another 111 anaesthetist of all grades supported the ICU 
though visiting teams outlined in figure 1. In order to 
support ICU naïve medical staff, a training programme 
was created and undertaken by the nursing professional 
development and the combined deployed consultant 
team which was a mixture of intensivists and anaesthetists. 
A programme of online video lectures and resources were 
developed by the consultant body providing learning on 
topics such as COVID-19 management, sedation and the 
basics of ventilator settings. Each individual had an induc-
tion to the unit and the opportunity to get hands on expe-
rience of some of the equipment they were unfamiliar 
with prior to their first ICU shift. As roles were simpli-
fied, those staff allocated to ‘end- of- bed’ care were taught 
about monitoring, recording data and raising concerns 
about physiological derangement. Staff trained to admin-
ister drugs were trained in checking and delivering infu-
sions. The visiting teams outlined in figure 1 were each 
trained in their roles. For example, the proning teams 
were trained in turning patients who were fully monitored 
and in relief of pressure points. The ICU had ventilation 
protocols already in place for usual non- COVID care; 
these were supported by our electronic systems so that 
if new staff recorded ventilated tidal volumes that were 
outside the protocol, the protocol could instruct them in 
what actions they should take.
A new staffing structure (figure 2) was put in place to 
mix the expertise of ICU doctors and non- ICU doctors. 
The day- to- day jobs, such a central line insertion, trips to 
the CT scanner, admitting patients, ordering radiographic 
investigations and blood tests and making referrals, were 
divided according to the skill- mix of the medical staff.
COVID-19 units were led by a sector commander, who 
was an experienced ICU consultant with overall respon-
sibility for their designated COVID-19 area comprising 
up to 40 patients. Each COVID-19 unit was then split so 
that teams guided therapy for between 15 and 20 patients 
each, with an area lead overseeing each Area. The area 
leads were anaesthetists who did not necessarily have 
recent ICU experience but are able to manage acute 
physiological changes and the airway. Each area also has a 
junior area lead, an ICU registrar, who fielded problems 
from more junior staff and escalated to the area lead or 
sector commander as appropriate.
Each COVID-19 area was further divided into Pods of 
4–6 patients; Pod doctors provided care for these patients. 
Pod doctors were from a variety of background ranging 
from ICU or anaesthetic junior trainees through to 
medical or surgical consultants. Pod doctors performed 
the initial daily morning and evening reviews to iden-
tify any ongoing issues or potential procedures which 
were escalated and validated to the area lead and sector 
commander. Each patient was reviewed by an ICU consul-
tant at least every 12 hours and usually more frequently, 
maintaining usual standards of senior oversight. Protoco-
lisation of care reduced the burden of scrutiny for consul-
tants responsible for the patients.
All ICU rotas were harmonised and organised such that 
staff are always working with the same team and provided 
a mix of ICU/anaesthetic staff and non- ICU doctors. 
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Figure 2 Organisation of medical staff within ICU. ICU, intensive care unit.
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their members and to allocate tasks appropriately. It also 
allowed limited training (eg, central venous catheterisa-
tion) to continue. Shifts were changed to full 12.5 hours 
resident shifts.
Nursing staff also had a hierarchical structure in order to 
cope with an influx of 429 nurses, 168 of whom had previ-
ously worked on ICU but another 261 were ICU naïve. 
1:1 nursing was provided to all patients who were sedated 
and ventilated but the bedside nurse was not always an 
ICU- trained nurse. An ICU- trained nurse oversaw up to 
six beds (depending on the skill mix of the bedside nurse 
and geography of the ICU) with a senior nurse (band 7) 
overseeing up to 35 patients.
The groups of nursing staff that were reallocated to 
support critical care services came from diverse clinical 
backgrounds: Research and Development, Acute Medical 
Unit, Theatres/Recovery, Biomedical Sciences, Preop-
erative Assessment, Coronary Care, Cardiology, Trainee 
ACCP, Clinical Nurse Specialist, Emergency Nurse Prac-
titioners, Ward Nurses, Night Practitioners, Professional 
Development Nurses, Orthodontic Nurses and Day Case. 
The ICU also used their core skills to provide care but 
they were also given basic core training that enabled the 
safe management of invasive monitoring, basic ventila-
tion principles and equipment training.
Theatre nursing staff were redeployed and allocated 
to visiting teams (such as the Care Team, Lines Team, 
Proning Team and Tracheostomy Team) who provided 
the Assembly Line care. They brought their under-
standing of sterile and surgical techniques while in PPE.
The physiotherapy team was supported by staff rede-
ployed from other clinical areas to provide cover from 
8:00 to 20:00 hours, 7 days per week. This was provided 
at a ratio of 1:12 with at least four senior physiotherapists 
on shift each day. The physiotherapy team provided respi-
ratory physiotherapy, including supporting the ongoing 
management of lung protective ventilation and rehabili-
tation where possible.
Policies and procedures
A small COVID-19 critical care multidisciplinary tactical 
group with prior experience in high consequence infec-
tious diseases led the rapid production of flexible policies 
and procedures. These included the donning and doffing 
of PPE, simulation, resuscitation, intubation, self- isolation 
and shift patterns. Policies were drawn up to consider 
safety of staff and to be able to stay within the confines of 
supply. Standard operating procedure templates allowed 
those staff members not familiar with ICU to perform 
tasks safely and to standards outlined by the ICU staff. 
Wards rounds were administered with the assistance of a 
template. Research active clinicians reviewed the latest, 
rapidly changing national and international evolution 
of evidence to feed back to the team in critical care and 
any alterations to the policies/Standard Operating Proce-
dures filtered down through various communication 
methods.
Communication
Communication with families was mainly undertaken by 
the Patient Liaison Team (see below).
Communication with colleagues both on and off ICU 
proved challenging with traditional use of bleeps and 
mobile phones problematic while wearing PPE. A new 
communication system was procured allowing hands- 
free Wi- Fi communication. The system was designed so 
staff could speak directly to another carrier of the device 
either by name or role. To communicate with visiting 
teams (Intubation, Lines, Proning, Tracheostomy), a 
single route of referral via one communication centre 
(one unused operating theatre) was established. A ‘red 
phone’ equipped with a louder ring was used in each 
ICU area as a back- up direct line of contact from ICU 
commander to the unit and vice versa.
Bedside key resource folders with laminated cleanable 
pages were created and information posters were displayed 
in the units. We used traditional email to distribute daily 
updates to the multidisciplinary team which also provided 
a portal for feedback. Social media (none of which carried 
patient information) was used with multiple WhatsApp 
groups (for immediate short- term decisions), Twitter (to 
engage with the wider community about current practise 
and boost morale) and Facebook (also to boost morale).
Service delivery
Care pathways were disaggregated into task sequences; 
discrete processes of care requiring specific skills sets. 
Care processes which could be delivered by non- intensive 
care staff redeployed to intensive care were identified. 
The teams were autonomous and able to deliver care 
as they saw fit. Processes were refined within each team 
without external influence. This allowed them flexibility 
about skill mix and staffing according to availability. 
These discrete teams were separate resources with no 
cross- over of staff to reduce the risk of externally acquired 
COVID-19 from spreading between teams. Cross- cover for 
sickness, self- isolation and caring for household members 
was managed within teams reducing stress on higher 
managers. Examples are given below:
Intubation team
A team of senior anaesthetists and operating department 
assistants was formed to perform all endotracheal intu-
bations in full PPE outside ICU in ward and ED patients 
with respiratory failure from COVID-19 infection. This 
allowed safe stabilisation of the patients and staff protec-
tion.
Proning team
Intensive proning simulation training was delegated 
to our anaesthetic and critical care physician- assistants 
(ACCP) who cascaded their training to neurosurgical 
consultants and other deployed theatre staff. The team 
consisted an airway trained practitioner (ACCP or anaes-
thetist) and four theatre non- scrub staff who moved 
between ICUs in full PPE.
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Lines team
Senior anaesthetists experienced in central venous cath-
eter insertion were allocated to spend their shift inserting 
lines of all types for new admissions and changing lines as 
directed by the ICU team. They were accompanied with 
a scrub team and carried limited equipment with them to 
reduce cross- contamination.
Care team
Theatre teams were formed to assist with washing and 
routine care to relieve pressure on the ICU nursing staff.
Percutaneous tracheostomy team
Ear, Nose and Throat and maxillofacial surgeons were 
seconded to the ICU and were accompanied by dedi-
cated, experienced anaesthetist. The ICU protocolised 
the process for insertion of a percutaneous tracheostomy 
which was agreed by the surgeons during surge prepara-
tions. The surgeons received training on the tracheos-
tomy insertion equipment used in the ICU. To reduce 
the need for cross- contamination and cleaning, a percu-
taneous insertion technique was used that did not use 
bronchoscopy. There was multidisciplinary agreement 
about the physiological parameters to guide selection 
for tracheostomy although the decision regarding the 
requirement for tracheostomy was made by an ICU 
consultant.
Patient liaison team
Medical Students in the fourth year (from five) of their 
university course were seconded to the ICU. They were 
protected from exposure to COVID-19 in the ICU by 
remaining outside and instead received daily updates 
about patients from a template completed by the nursing 
staff caring for the patient. Wherever possible, the same 
medical student rang the family at the same time of day to 
try to reduce anxiety in the family over delayed or unex-
pected calls
Renal replacement therapy team
Although the number of renal replacement therapy 
(RRT) was lower than the same period 12 months ago, 
the surge meant that more patients required RRT simul-
taneously. A protocol was developed to enable the sharing 
of machines while providing adequate clearance and fluid 
balance control. The protocol underwent real- time modi-
fication when it became clear that many of the patients 
exhibited a hypercoagulative state. Most patients where 
managed with 4 hours of high volume haemodiafiltration 
(6L ultrafiltration exchange per hour), and net nega-
tive fluid balance of 100 mL per hour during treatment. 
Machines were then cleaned before being used with the 
next patient. Most machines treated three patients during 
any 24 hours period. Our ICU moved to Fresenius 8005 
machines with a sterile water plant with individual reverse 
osmosis units for each and so we had no problems with 
supply of RRT fluids.
Ventilation team
The physiotherapy team were tasked with supporting 
compliance with lung protective ventilation. This 
included measuring patients on admission, with height 
and ideal lung protective tidal volumes displayed on white 
boards in the patients bedspace. The physiotherapy team 
also completed morning and evening ward rounds where 
ventilator settings were reviewed and changed according 
to a protocol.
Research team
The importance of research in understanding COVID-19 
disease was recognised by maintenance of a skeleton 
research staff. The research nurse team was cut to 12% 
of its normal personnel and 80% of reallocated staff 
were directed towards the ICU with the rest shielding 
due to existing co- morbidities. Our hospital fell into line 
with the national requirement for participating Urgent 
Public Health Research Studies (https://www. nihr. ac. uk/ 
covid- studies/) approved by the chief medical officer and 
recruited to 19 of those studies.
Training and education
All formal educational assessment requirements were 
always suspended but informal bedside teaching 
continued day or night provided by senior team members 
to those more junior. This was met with enthusiasm, 
particularly from the ICU naïve members and excellent 
feedback given regarding teaching and support. The Crit-
ical Care Clinical Nursing Education workforce had their 
normal rotas adapted to facilitate 24/7 support for all 
redeployed nursing workforce.
Psychosocial support
It was recognised that the service reconfiguration and 
overwhelming nature of the COVID-19 surge brought 
with it a burden of physiological and emotional chal-
lenges. Personnel were working in unfamiliar environ-
ments with the constant stress of being exposed to a 
harmful infective agent.
Critical care nursing had already appointed a restor-
ative practice lead nurse before the pandemic but as the 
workforce expanded, an additional full- time senior nurse 
was seconded to support delivering clinics, meeting staff, 
telephone and social networking forums. This allowed 
staff access to emotional and psychological support 
during the day and night. Where necessary, the Restor-
ative practice nurses could refer staff to trust councillors 
and psychologists.
In addition to the social media channels mentioned 
above, a named wellness champion sent regular emails to 
all colleagues and made themselves available for conver-
sations that were difficult to have with other colleagues 
or family. Well- being rest rooms were identified which 
provided access to a bed, hot drinks and refreshments for 
time out of the PPE and away from the ICU. Hot meals 
were delivered day and night to the COVID-19 staff rest 
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rooms and staff were offered meal vouchers for use in the 
hospital canteen.
These initiatives were welcomed and staff report that 
they felt they had clear pathways they could use if needed 
and a well signposted first contact to use for a variety of 
needs. Close working with occupational health profes-
sionals helped to supplement and support guidance given 
regarding shielding or sickness. Analysis of staff feedback 
is underway and will be reviewed in regards to ongoing 
improvements that can be made to out support structure.
RESULTS
During the 4 weeks of April 2020, a total of 154 patients 
were admitted to the dedicated COVID-19 ICUs. Thir-
teen patients were negative for COVID-19 based on nasal 
swabs and non- directed broncho- alveloar lavage samples. 
Overall mortality for the cohort was 27% (n=42). Median 
length of ICU stay was 19 days (range 1–50 days) and the 
median time to death was 9.5 days (range 1–40 days).
A sample of our time from decision to admit from the 
ward or ED to safe transfer to ICU was 110.7±76.75 min 
(±SD, N=19) compared with 193.8±123.8 min (±SD, 
n=15) (p=0.022). In many cases, it was unclear when 
the decision to admit to ICU was made and many of our 
patients were admitted from other hospitals and so were 
not included in the calculations.
We provided 3402 patient days care on ICU during 
April 2020, compared with 2599 for the same month in 
2019 (30.9% increase) but absolute patient numbers 
(COVID-19 and non- COVID) decreased to 274 from 428 
(35.9 decrease), a reflection of the length of stay of the 
average patient with COVID-19 disease. A total of 126 
patients were cared for simultaneously compared with a 
peak of 86 patients in the previous year (46.5% increase). 
The number of ventilated days increased in the same 
period to 1845 from 694 (165.8% increase). In the equiva-
lent period in 2019, 58 tracheostomies were inserted; this 
compares with 114 tracheostomies during the COVID-19 
crisis in April 2020. Table 1 summarises these differences 
in activity. Between the 8 April and 8 May, there were 
180 recorded patient interactions for the Line team with 
16 Arterial lines, 98 vascaths, 89 Central Venous and 12 
Peripherally Inserted Central Catheter insertions, a total 
of 215 lines in all. In total 60% of patients admitted with 
symptoms of COVID-19 pneumonia were ventilated in 
the prone position with many requiring five episodes of 
proning. At the peak, the proning teams carried out 52 
proning/deproning procedures in a 12- hour shift.
During the same period, 98 patients commenced mobil-
isation within critical care, defined as sitting on the edge 
of the bed or higher. All 84 patients discharged from crit-
ical care during the study period had commenced mobil-
isation and on average were able to stand or step transfer 
prior to ward step down.
We saw relatively few staff absences. Figure 3 plots ICU 
staff absence because of illness (combined long term and 
short term). Normal nursing absenteeism was approxi-
mately 10% and this rose to 12.1% before falling again. 
We had a spate of medical staff who caught COVID-19 
just before a period of this study and so we saw a fall in 
medical absenteeism back to baseline 1.3% during the 
surge itself, having previously been a high 5.1%.
DISCUSSION
The Long Shops were the first recorded example in the 
UK of assembly line manufacture. Dating back to the 
height of the industrial revolution, they broke down the 
manufacture of agricultural machinery, steam engines 
and trolleybuses into small manageable parts. Appren-
tices could be taught to become skilled at just a few tasks 
on the line and did not need to be proficient in the whole 
process. This allowed more complex machines to be 
made as well as shortened the time needed for workers to 
become proficient. We believe that we have used a similar 
production line model for the care of ICU patients to 
manage the surge in redeployed staff and COVID-19 
during the first wave of a global pandemic.
Although previous work alerted us to the pressures 
that we expected to cope with during the first wave 
surge,7–9 we could find no information on how to 








Patients admitted to ICU 274 428 −35.9
Total patient care days 3402 2599 +30.9
Simultaneous patients cared for 126 86 +46.5
Ventilated patient days 1845 694 +165.8
No of tracheostomies performed 114 58 +96
ICU, intensive care unit.
Figure 3 ICU staff sickness between 30 March 2020 and 18 
April 2020. ICU, intensive care unit.
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implement preparations in a large ICU. We believe that 
breaking ICU care into its component parts and taking 
an Assembly Line approach to its delivery allowed a flex-
ibility to cope with a surge in patient numbers while also 
enabling a wide- ranging teaching programme, ensuring 
that teams were protected from burnout, reducing cross- 
contamination between teams from infected patients and 
accommodating staff absences. In addition to unprece-
dented patient numbers in a short period of time, we also 
dealt with a surge in additional staff who needed training 
and a role suited to their skills, all while maintaining 
patient safety and a high standard of care. We increased 
our efficiency so that there was always an ICU bed imme-
diately available and the time to admission of a patient to 
ICU was reduced even in the face of what would other-
wise have been overwhelming numbers.
In terms of mortality rates, the Assembly Line approach 
provided a quality of care which was at least comparable 
to other hospitals in the UK. One criticism may be that 
the Assembly Line does not allow for bespoke adaptation, 
however, as our surge capacity was for a single disease, the 
need for adaptation of our protocols was minimal.
When Garrett and Sons14 introduced the Assembly 
Line, it was dedicated to only manufacturing one product. 
Similarly, our changes facilitated the treatment of one 
disease, COVID-19, but was not necessarily suitable for 
the management of the full spectrum of critical illness.
It is unclear whether an Assembly Line provides better 
care. Concerns were voiced that by deconstructing ICU 
care into discrete tasks staff would become deskilled in 
various procedures and may face challenges to the care 
process without the holistic approach normally adopted. 
It was felt that, as these measures were put in place to deal 
with a short term surge of characteristically similar cases, 
the workforce would quickly be able to reacquaint them-
selves with those skills and procedures once the need for 
a long shop approach had passed. A future review from 
our workgroup based on the feedback from staff, both 
redeployed and ICU based, will formally assess to what 
extent these measures had on staff moral, training and 
acceptance of our dramatically different approach to ICU 
care in face of the COVID-19 crisis.
We believe that strict infection prevention control 
and the early introduction of donning and doffing areas 
protected the ICU from a large increase in staff absen-
teeism. We also believe that staff confidence and mental 
well- being was enhanced by these clearly defined areas.
CONCLUSIONS
In April 2020, our ICU was faced with a surge in critically 
ill patients but also a surge in staff redeployed to help cope 
with the expected increase in patient numbers. We were 
fortunate in being able to reallocate large staffing numbers 
from elsewhere in the hospital to the ICU and use their 
specific skills into discrete teams. We have described a 
model of care that we believe may be useful for ICUs of all 
sizes when faced with abrupt changes in demand.
We found that significant changes to all aspects of 
ICU, from staff structuring to clinical delivery, greatly 
improved the ICU capacity and efficiency as measured 
by time to admission. Important lessons have been 
learnt about what can be achieved in a short space of 
time when required. A number of the initiatives imple-
mented are clearly only viable in the short term (lines 
teams, proning teams, trachy teams), other measures 
have a more widespread use for a unit under significant 
workload pressure such as family liaison teams, ventila-
tion and RRT teams.
Measures such as staff absenteeism and feedbackfrom 
redeployed staff were good. Rates of COVID-19 acquired 
from working in the ICU were low and sickness for other 
reasons including stress were little different from pre- 
COVID. Staff feedback for teaching and how supported 
they felt was good and the numbers of staff willing to return 
to ICU for any subsequent surge are high.
We believe that the system we employed for the first 
surge in COVID-19 patients to our institution will serve as 
a good starting point for other organisations.
Twitter Tony Whitehouse @Whitehouse_ICU
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